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16 June 1965

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State Department review completed



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1			
	2.	Dominican Republic: Rebel attacks designed in part to obtain more direct United Nations intervention. (Page 3)	-
	3.	Trucial States: British-Egyptian confrontation in Persian Gulf approaching climax. (Page 4)	
25X1			
	6.	Western Europe: Both Germans and French moderately satisfied with Erhard - De Gaulle talks. (Page 7)	
25X1	7.	Notes: Chile; (Page 8)	25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) Yesterday's rebel attacks on the Inter-American forces in Santo Domingo seem to have been motivated in part by a desperate effort to obtain more direct United Nations intervention in the Dominican imbroglio.

Within an hour after the initial rebel attack on US troops, the rebel radio was broadcasting its account of the ''Yankee attack'' complete with inflammatory allegations that US forces were killing women and children. The rebels lodged a protest with the UN observer team in Santo Domingo and the rebel foreign minister cabled a detailed protest to the UN Secretary General. The Security Council has scheduled a meeting for this afternoon to consider yesterday's events.

For the past several weeks the rebels have been progressively more critical of the OAS role in the crisis and clearly anxious to enhance the part being played by the UN, which they consider more sympathetic to their cause.

Another factor behind yesterday's rebel action is probably the increased influence of hard-line extremist groups among the rebel paramilitary units, and particularly of the pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ). The APCJ issued a publication during the big rebel rally on Monday which spelled out its view that armed struggle, and not negotiation, is the only proper means of consolidating the "popular revolution." It urged the immediate extension of the struggle to the interior and may, in fact, have calculated that an intensification of the fighting in the capital would spark uprisings in the towns and cities of the provinces. There have been no reports of any such disturbances in the interior.

Yesterday's fighting, which lasted most of the daylight hours, resulted in 24 US and one Brazilian wounded in action. At least sixteen rebels have been killed.


16 June 65

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16 June 65



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Trucial States: (The British-Egyptian confrontation in the Persian Gulf seems to be approaching a climax.)

The semi-official press in Cairo has reported that implementation of Arab League aid projects in the British-protected Trucial States will begin next week. Three league experts representing Kuwait, Iraq, and Egypt were scheduled to fly to the gulf yesterday to set up the first stage of a \$14 million development program promised for the next few years.

In order to deny Egypt a foothold for subversive activities in the gulf, Britain has been insisting that five of the protectorates cancel agreements made with the Arab League last month. Even though Britain and local states hostile to the league have raised their offer of aid for the Trucial States Development Fund up to \$7 million, the dissident shaikhs seem intent on proceeding with their league arrangements.

Their recalcitrance threatens a violation of the treaties by which London handles the Trucial States' foreign affairs. The protectorates are reportedly considering renouncing them unilaterally and appealing to Egypt for protection?

The British profess a determination to stand firm, but apparently have not decided what they can do to prevent league presence. Any British action may induce the Trucial States' rulers to renounce the treaties. London apparently feels that it could legally do nothing but accept such a move by the rulers.

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Western Europe: Both the Germans and the French were moderately well satisfied with the talks between Erhard and De Gaulle last week end, according to initial comments from participants.

Foreign Minister Schroeder told Ambassador McGhee that both sides had tried to avoid those issues where sharp differences existed. According to Osterheld, Erhard's personal assistant, De Gaulle had some success in quieting German fears about his policies.

German informants have indicated that the first categorical announcement to the press, that agreement had been reached on a summit of the Six this year to discuss European political unity, was premature. They report that the French withheld final approval pending solution of the unresolved EEC financial problems in Brussels.

De Gaulle reportedly took a relaxed attitude toward NATO. He acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the Alliance in some form after 1969 and indicated that there would be plenty of time to make specific proposals before then. The French leader said he had not yet made up his mind about the McNamara proposals for a select committee on nuclear matters.

De Gaulle appeared to play down his theme of Europeanizing the German unification question. He also seemed to accept tacitly the German contention that trade credits to East Germany should be treated differently from credits to the East European states. He avoided attacking German support for the US position on Vietnam.

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Chile: President Frei has told Ambassador
Dungan that the Cuban Solidarity Congress will not
be held in Chile. According to the ambassador, Frei
was annoyed at Interior Minister Leighton for granting
permission for the congress. The President has told
both Leighton and Foreign Minister Valdes that they
are to see that the congress does not take place, but
he did not elaborate on how this should be done.

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